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1Organisational Path-Dependence and Institutional Environments:
The Case of East Asia’s Chinese Family Business Groups
Abstract
Through a case study of Chinese Family Business Groups (FBGs) in East Asia, this paper
examines the relationship between the strategic behaviour exhibited by an organisational form
and it's administrative heritage. To do so, we trace the origins of the strategic behaviour which
scholars commonly attribute to FBGs to the environmental conditions prevailing during their
emergence in the turbulent post-Colonial era of East Asia. We explain how fundamental changes
brought about by shifts in the post-Cold war environment of East Asia have confronted FBGs
with new opportunities and organising imperatives which their administrative heritages have left
them ill-equipped to deal with. In concluding, we explain how the lack of fit between a dominant
organisational form and contemporaneous environmental conditions may have significant
implications for the organisations themselves and the economies whose landscape's they
dominate.
Keywords Path Dependence, Administrative Heritage, Family Business Groups, East Asia,
Financial Crisis, Corporate Governance.
2Introduction
The business behaviour of East Asian Chinese Family Business Groups (FBGs) is often linked to
Confucian values that promote diligence, order, filial piety and familial responsibility (Fukuyama,
1995). Some analysts have argued that the modern day FBGs which are prominent features of the
economic landscapes of Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines
(Claessens, Djankov, Fan & Lang, 1999) are uniquely a product of their Confucian cultural
heritage (Hall & Wu, 1990, Wong, 1985). Indeed, many of the business practices commonly
ascribed to Chinese FBGs undoubtedly reflect the cultural values of their founding entrepreneurs
(Koa, 1993, Fukuyama, 1995). On the other hand, since Confucian values have endured over
many centuries (Fukuyama, 1995), but the capitalistic-entrepreneurial behaviour often attributed
to FBGs has been notably absent through much of this period (Hodder, 1996), cultural factors
alone cannot explain the ascendancy of this form of business enterprise in East Asia.
In this article we adopt an historical perspective in order to identify and describe the
environmental conditions and pre-conditions which led to the emergence of Chinese FBGs as
engine of economic development for much East Asia (Seagrave, 1996). In doing so, we illustrate
how dominant organisational forms and the institutional arrangements that engender them evolve
along path-dependent trajectories. Insights from organisation theory suggest that emergent firms
adopt business practices and develop routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982) that strongly reflect their
nascent institutional environments (Starbuck, 1965). Such an administrative heritage may leave
firms ill-equipped to meet the environmental challenges of a subsequent era (Bartlett & Ghoshal,
1989). At the same time, organisations (particularly dominant ones) interact with, and shape their
institutional environments (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) in both active and passive ways. As a
consequence, institutional environments come to reflect the needs and demands of dominant
organisations. Such a pattern of evolution has a number of significant firm and economy-level
implications that are discussed in the concluding section.
3The Nature of Path Dependency
Many scholars in strategic management see firm-level strategic behaviour as essentially a product
of rational, goal directed adaptation to environmental conditions (Andrews, 1971). For example,
resource allocation is often viewed from the perspective of Chandler's (1962) seminal structure-
follows-strategy thesis. According to this view, firms adapt their strategies and structures to
reflect their changing technological and market conditions. On the other hand, much of the
evidence from the recent economic history of East-Asia is suggestive of strategic and structural
persistence rather than firm-level adaptation in the face of technological and market change
(Prowse, 1998, Claessens, 1998). Many East Asian businesses remain wedded to the same array
of industries and employ many of the same organising principles that characterised the initial
stages of East Asian industrialisation (Backman, 1999; Garran, 1998).
To explain such an emergence and persistence of firm strategy, institutional theories of
organisations have identified a range of cognitive, bureaucratic and political processes that
impede the smooth re-alignment of an organisation with its environment (Oliver, 1991; DiMaggio
& Powell, 1991; Hamilton & Biggart, 1988). What North (1990) calls the “institutional matrix”
refers to the legal, cultural and normative foundations of a firm’s environment.
The importance of the institutional matrix lays in the way in which it shapes the choices
and incentives facing economic agents. North (1990) suggests that institutional matrices develop
and change in a path-dependent manner. This means that once a particular developmental path
has been selected (or even unintentionally adopted) forces are set in motion that reinforces
momentum along it. The adaptive expectations of economic and political agents act to orient
behaviour toward the opportunities and incentives presented by an initial path. Following a course
of least resistance, values, attitudes, behaviours and practices that are consistent with the initial
path come to be reinforced, legitimated and institutionalised. At the same time values, attitudes,
behaviours and practices that are inconsistent with a path will tend to wither or fail to develop.
Practices, norms and beliefs that encounter high institutional resistance will not be widely
4diffused in society since energies can be more profitably directed toward more legitimate and
institutionally sanctioned ends. Consequently business and regulatory institutions adapt to each
other and produce strategic responses that strongly reflect their unique administrative heritages.
Contemporary institutional matrices have been shaped by distant, sometimes seemingly
inconsequential, events that lock-in particular policy models and approaches to problems. Since
the effectiveness of a particular strategic response is largely a function of the firm’s environment
(Andrews, 1971, Hofer, 1975), a strategy that is effective under one set of environmental
conditions may be much less effective under a later, changed set of conditions. For instance,
Bartlett & Ghoshal (1989) describe how many European multinational enterprises that emerged in
the first half of the 20th century adopted highly decentralised organisational structures as a means
on managing their foreign operations. Such federated operating structures had many virtues in the
context of a global business environment characterised by nationalist economic policies and
highly fragmented and localised product, factor and capital markets. On the other hand, such a
legacy has left many European multinationals with path dependencies ill suited for the
increasingly integrated product, factor and capital markets of the modern global economy.
Importantly, North (1990) points out that the path dependent character of an institutional
matrix means that even well managed firms may have difficulty aligning themselves with new
environmental conditions. North argues convincingly that changes to formal rules are often
insufficient to bring about institutional change if they are inconsistent with the prevailing culture,
beliefs, norms and interests in the institutional matrix.
In the sections below, we illustrate this phenomenon through a case study of Chinese
FBGs in East Asia. We first describe the origins of these FBGs and highlight the environmental
conditions which led to their ascendancy in the wake of WWII. Next, we explain how FBGs and
their institutional environments evolved on path dependent trajectories. Finally, we describe how
these path dependencies have left many firms and the economies they dominate out of synch with
respect to the conditions they face today in the global economy.
5The Emergence and Ascendance of Chinese FBGs
Emigrants from Mainland China founded a very large percentage of East Asia's FBGs (Sommers-
Heidues, 1974; Wu & Wu, 1980; Suryadinata 1989). Overseas Chinese merchants were an
important non-Colonial capitalist class in East Asia since the pre-colonial and European colonial
era where immigrants from South China were employed as tax collectors and commercial
intermediaries or compradores (Lim, 1996; McVey, 1992).
Today the overseas Chinese are the dominant commercial class in many East Asian
economies including Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and The
Philippines (Hodder, 1996; Lim, 1996; Mackie, 1992). In Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, and The
Philippines ethnic Chinese are demographic minorities, yet account for a disproportionate
magnitude of economic activity. The importance of overseas Chinese in Indonesia is a
particularly striking example of this phenomenon. While they total only 3% of Indonesia's
population, firms controlled by overseas Chinese account for more than half of the country's trade
and three quarters of its private domestic capital (Hodder, 1996, Lim, 1996).
East and Southeast Asian FBGs emerged during a period of extreme political turbulence
(McVey, 1992). Colonial disengagement, communist insurgency and the establishment of
nationalistic government characterised the post WWII period. In this environment FBGs emerged
as the region’s major entrepreneurial force and their social status improved from that of ‘pariah
to paragon’ (McVey, 1992). Such a description reflects the fact that in the colonial era and at the
beginning of the nationalist era, now pre-eminent Chinese entrepreneurs were a marginal social
group subject to discrimination, arbitrary state confiscation of their private property and popular
violence. The appearance of the FBG owes much to these unfavourable founding conditions.
Social conditions in Mainland China produced a large and continuing Diaspora. The
overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia are a product of turmoil in their home country. Acute social
instability and recurrent civil war including the Taiping Rebellion in 1851-1864, the Boxer
rebellion, the Republican Revolution, Civil war, and the Cultural revolution of 1966-1976
6produced a steady migration from mainland China (Fairbank, 1994). The Chinese state's disdain
for commercial activity did little to advance the interests of domestic entrepreneurs who were
forced to emigrate (Redding, 1990). As such, overseas Chinese entrepreneurs emanated from an
unstable, warring society that placed little value on commercial activity and had no
entrepreneurial tradition.
 In the late 19th and early 20th centuries migrant Chinese workers settled in predominantly
agricultural colonial societies where alien Westerners occupied elite economic and political
positions. Leading colonial industries of plantation agriculture, mining and oil extraction created
a range of new intermediary economic roles in society, which recently landed Chinese
immigrants, were encouraged to take up. New occupations such as tax collecting, retailing, and
money-lending and other ancillary roles related to resource based industrialisation were filled by
overseas Chinese who hitherto had no entrepreneurial experience (McVey, 1992). Within the
colonial order, overseas Chinese petit-entrepreneurs developed contacts with domestic elites and
learned commercial skills that later filled a vacuum left by departing colonial powers. First, as the
compradores of Western colonial powers, Chinese entrepreneurs familiarised themselves with
Western business practices. Many subsequently established businesses based on Western models
(Chan, 1982). For example, Singapore’s Overseas Chinese Banks founded in the 1920s were
modelled on US banks by former Chinese employees of the New York City Bank (Yoshihara,
1988).
The skills and contacts developed by Chinese entrepreneurs during the colonial era
increased in value subsequent to the widespread colonial retreat that took place after WWII
because indigenous entrepreneurial skills were in short supply.
Chinese migration was widespread in the region and entrepreneurs maintained personal
contacts among entrepreneurs from the same family or language group in many East Asian
countries. Close-knit, spatially dispersed networks offer channels for mobilising assets and for
sharing information about business opportunities (Koa, 1993; Hodder, 1996). In this manner, the
7Diaspora produced an entrepreneurial class that was well placed to operate international networks
and attuned to the behaviour of a diverse group of key actors.
The main concern for post WWII national governments was national security. There was
a need to restore internal order or fend off external communist threats- a goal shared by US
foreign policy. Consequently, many government officials in East Asia were drawn from military
ranks and had little knowledge of business and economics. During this time, national economic
agendas were commonly limited to managing strategic industries and rebuilding basic
infrastructure. Strategic industries were managed by establishing state owned enterprises and
infrastructure was created with the assistance of US aid. Prior to the late 1980s, there was little
Japanese investment in East Asia- a function of both Japan’s own nationalist economic agenda
and a legacy of Japanese assets being confiscated and turned over to indigenous governments at
the close of WWII. Much capital for investment came from local savings (Singh, 1998).
Observing the success of post WWII Japanese industrial policy, beginning with Korea and
Taiwan and spreading sequentially through Southeast Asia, governments adopted export oriented
development models. These policies focused upon the provision of tax incentives and low
interests loans to spur production and the utilisation of low cost labour to compete in textile and
consumer durables. Such export oriented development (EOD) models provided many
opportunities to cosmopolitan Chinese entrepreneurs.
Of particular note were Chinese entrepreneurs who cultivated relations with Japanese
manufacturers. Seeking to re-establish entry into East Asian markets Japanese producers needed
local partners to surmount tariff walls. Western colonial firms operating in the region already had
strong relations with European sources and at that time did not perceive much potential in
Japanese manufacturers (Yoshihara 1988). Chinese entrepreneurs were less established and
willing to link up with Japanese partners. Whether due to a cultural affinity, social marginality or
western hubris, circumstances put the Chinese into a series of minority joint-ventures, licensing
agreement and technology sharing agreements with Japanese partners in product-markets such as
8textiles, food processing and cement production. Through these relationships, many FBGs were
able to develop and acquire basic process engineering competencies.
Despite the fact that FBGs embodied an entrepreneurial drive and possessed
competencies well suited for export oriented development models, they were owned by a highly
visible ethnic minority in many countries and did not always enjoy the full protection of the state.
In Thailand, Indonesia and The Philippines political corruption and bureaucratic ‘rent-seeking’
(McVey, 1992) produced wariness of the state. Despite their economic success, and indeed
possibly because of it, Chinese entrepreneurs encountered discrimination and asset expropriation.
Recent violence against Chinese property in Indonesia indicates that this hostility is both grave
and enduring. Overseas Chinese entrepreneurs suffered official discrimination in Malaysia and
Indonesia from nationalist policies intended to secure greater participation in the economy for
ethnic nationals (Lim, 1996). In Hong Kong FBG entrepreneurs enjoyed a relatively laissez faire
relationship with the Colonial state, but they were nevertheless all but excluded from elite
positions (Whitley, 1992). Fear of Chinese aggression in Taiwan and a return to Chinese
sovereignty in Hong Kong did little to assuage age-old uncertainties about state expropriation.
Government connections offered the opportunity for many FBGs to use their personal
network or guanxi to secure national production franchises and other licenses. However, the
initial relationship between nationalist states and the entrepreneurial Chinese was at best one of
indifference and mutual mistrust (Yoshihara, 1988). These relations have become more
accommodating in recent times, but in the 1950s and 60s governments did not particularly favour
the overseas Chinese, but they did need entrepreneurs and the Chinese filled that gap (McVey,
1992).
The Creation of an Administrative Heritage
The forces of Diaspora, national economic policy and hostile state bureaucracy described above
created the conditions for the appearance of FBGs. This environment was simultaneously
threatening and full of opportunity for FBGs. However, it was in this environment that FBGs
9forged a characteristic set of business routines and strategic behaviours that would best protect
their economic interests and which would later become their hallmark.  While culture, politics
and historical events posed a number of constraints, FBGs responded to prevailing conditions in a
manner that was fully consistent with the rationalities of a family business.
Regardless of context, the concentration of personal and family wealth in owner-managed
firms normally creates a preference for income and for wealth preservation over other dimensions
of enterprise performance such as growth (Dyers, 1986). As highlighted by agency theory other
key differences in strategic goals stem from the risk bearing attributes of owner-managed
enterprise (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Owner managed enterprises are not well equipped to bear
risk. Owners are likely to have a large proportion of their wealth and income tied to the
performance of their enterprises. Such a concentration of undiversified risk increases the firm's
effective cost of capital (Fame & Jensen, 1983) and may result in risk-averse strategic behaviour.
While FBGs are motivated to accumulate wealth, family needs create pressures to extract
capital from the business (Chandler, 1990). Such pressures reduce available capital for
organisational growth. FBG ownership is ordinarily concentrated in the hands of a founding
entrepreneur, the immediate family or ancestral trust depending upon the age of the firm (Wong,
1985). When the family firm's assets account for a significant proportion of that family's wealth
significant risk can be reduced, and the preservation of wealth better assured by extracting capital
from the business and allocating it to alternative sources. In the post war Southeast Asian political
environment the risk of expropriation reinforced the prudential avoidance of capital
concentration.
Other forces promote a near term focus on immediate earnings. To provide income for an
extended family and inheritances for male offspring who may wish to establish their own
patrilineal businesses there is additional pressure to extract income from the core business.
Redding (1990:109) suggests the spirit of Chinese entrepreneurship is infused with values which
'facilitate the initiating phase of entrepreneurship but which place barriers to the higher levels of
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co-ordination necessary for growth'. Under these conditions goals related to patient capital and
large scale or enterprise growth give way to a concern for near-term profitability and family
wealth preservation. Equity market prices reflect both imputed short and long term firm values
but unless the owners plan to reduce its holdings in the firm, equity market value will not be as
important a goal as is accounting income.
FBGs and the Allocation of Capital
A defining element of a firm’s strategy is its capital allocation routines (Chandler, 1962). In Asian FBGs
capital allocation proved to be a pivotal influence on the establishment of their administrative heritage. We
have noted the inefficient risk bearing properties of owner managed firms. One means of diversifying risk
while maintaining family control is to diversify at the product-market level. FBGs are noted for wide
diversification. A typical pattern is to establish a manufacturing business followed by diversification into
trading activities followed by investments in property and financial services (Lassere & Schutte, 1995). The
manufacturing opportunities offered by EOD policies provided the initial impetus to FBG growth.
However, FBGs do not possess a particular affinity for manufacturing activities. The propensity for capital
dispersion weighs against success in capital intensive manufacturing activity.
Many analysts have noted the overseas Chinese propensity for deal making, trading, and
speculating (Chu & McMurray, 1993). Entrepreneurs favour, and excel, with opaque transactions
based upon privileged information and personalised relations or guanxi; this Chinese word refers
to the practice of drawing on connections to secure favours in personal or business relations.
Lasserre & Schutte (1995) see FBG success as stemming from guanxi and the related ability to
exploit market imperfections arising from access to privileged contacts and non-publicly
available information. Capitalising upon such opportunities does not require a competence-based
rationale. Many of these opportunities are self-limiting or temporary and do not require a major
capital commitment. Therefore at the level of the business group the FBG tends to be widely
diversified.
FBGs tend to disperse their assets into multiple separate public listings. Ultimate majority
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ownership is typically concentrated in a private enterprise registered in an offshore country of
convenience. Breaking up large groups into smaller units reduces the enterprise’s visibility, a
basic defence mechanism for a firm in a hostile environment. However, fragmentation and the
creation of multiple separately listed public units is a means of achieving monitoring and
feedback on unit performance when subsidiary managers are not trusted, or when the organisation
has inadequate capacity to perform a thorough internal auditing function (Carney, 1998). Daily
market valuation of a business unit's performance is a valuable managerial decision tool, which is
an advantage denied most diversified firms. Consequently, at the level of the firm, product market
scope is narrowly focused.
Discrimination and local hostility encouraged FBGs to develop a highly liquid and
generic asset regimes that could be rapidly deployed. Koa (1993) suggests the preference for
liquid and tangible assets results from deeply held ‘life-raft values’ stemming from generations of
economic and political uncertainty. Liquid assets are mobile and moved under a perceived threat.
Moreover, a guanxi driven diversification and the propensity to speculate also demands access to
liquid assets if the firm is to profit from fleeting opportunities. Family wealth preservation goals
and the capital allocation strategies that support those goals in turn influence the way FBGs
compete in the market place.
FBG Product-Market Strategies
Establishing large enterprises and creating brand capital requires patient capital and also increase
the visibility of an enterprise, something foreign entrepreneurs may wish to avoid. Resource
commitments in dedicated assets or lock-in investments reduce the flexibility that is central to
FBGs adaptive-entrepreneurial capabilities. Instead, capital investment is directed to generic
assets that are readily deployed to respond to shifts in fashion and volume (Redding, 1990).
Moreover, because FBGs appropriate residual returns and tend to focus upon accounting profits
they have a strong incentive to reduce operating costs (Carney, 1998). The ready availability of
low cost labour along with these incentives combined to provide FBGs with a competitive
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advantage based upon cost leadership. Rather than seeking to build competitive advantage
through innovation or the creation of proprietary assets FBGs have typically focused upon the
manufacture of products that were conceived and designed elsewhere (Hobday, 1995, 2000).
Relatedly, the international activities of the FBG are limited to labour seeking FDI and
quasi-portfolio investment (Yoshihara, 1988). The success of the export led development policies
in Southeast Asia eroded domestic firms labour cost advantages, especially in settings such as
Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. Faced with higher costs FBGs began to internationalise to
seek cheaper labour (Lecraw, 1993). The first international investments by FBGs were
manufacturing transplant activities, which were financed through internally generated funds.
However, manufacturing investments are minor relative to a second wave of investments in
service sectors, particularly in infrastructure, property development and financial services.
Second wave investments were made possible by a flood of foreign portfolio investments and
commercial bank lending (Henderson, 1998) that enabled FBGs to make many ill-fated asset
purchases. Many assets acquired in this way have proven to be overpriced and are now non-
performing.
FBG investments in services may be viewed as the exploitation of firm specific
advantages in the management of labour intensive processes (for example, in construction and
hotel management) and in trade and financing (Lecraw, 1993; Dunning, 1995). Alternatively,
many of the international investments of FBGs may be driven by personal connections or guanxi
and are project-specific investments aimed at generating fast returns. Investments based upon
guanxi may be a fundamental cause of capital misallocation. While guanxi provides market
access, it does little to contribute to a firm's technical or managerial capabilities. Indeed, guanxi
may do the opposite. Because investments stem from personal connections they escape internal
bureaucratic and market scrutiny leading to widespread allocation to inefficient or low return
projects.
13
Eventually, decreasing investment yields cause exportation of capital. Indeed, Taiwan
and Hong Kong are currently now net exporters of capital (UNCTAD, 1994). While some have
heralded capital exports as evidence of the emergence FDI and the development of the Asian
multinational, another possibility is that it is a form of disguised portfolio investment and a case
of capital flight (Yoshihara, 1988). In the latter view, a significant portion of Asian FDI may be
neither market nor asset seeking, rather it is wealth seeking. In this case FDI reflects attempts by
entrepreneurs to internationally diversify their personal and familial wealth.
 To sum up, post war Asian FBGs exhibited strategic behaviour aimed at wealth
preservation and near term accounting profits. They pursued conglomerate diversification
strategies and their balance sheets consisted of tended towards generic and liquid assets.
International investments were first labour seeking, but later, fuelled by foreign portfolio inflows,
investments were deal driven without any competence-based rationale. Widely practised, such
strategies provided the entrepreneurial drive behind the export-led era of East and Southeast
Asian industrialisation. Indeed, it is the great success of these strategies that constitute the lasting
administrative heritage of the FBG as an organisational form. However, elements of this heritage
are self-limiting over the long run. The currency devaluations that precipitated the 1997 financial
crisis were based upon weak organisational fundamentals (Backman, 1999; Garran, 1998;
Henderson, 1998). Nevertheless, broad environmental changes are bringing about conditions that
may support new strategic behaviours, which may contribute to improved productivity and firm
competitiveness.
Developments in the Modern Era
The end of the cold war and the rise of Japan as a global economic power represent two epochal
developments that fundamentally changed East and Southeast Asia's political and economic
environment. China’s adoption in 1978 of Deng Xiao Ping's four modernisation’s resulted in the
gradual opening of China to foreign investment (Fairbank, 1994). This major policy shift
signalled a reduction in cold war tensions and allowed states in the region to focus upon the
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economic agenda. Another crucial event was the Plaza Accord signed by the G5 countries in
1985, which led to a rapid appreciation of the Japanese Yen against other major currencies. The
Plaza Accord signalled the beginning of the end of Japanese export oriented development and led
to large outward Japanese investments into other East Asian economies (Stubbs, 1999). These
two events accelerated the movement of capital into and within the region. In response to these
capital movements many states initiated partial liberalisations in their capital markets and eased
restrictions on the foreign ownership of domestic firms (World Bank, 1996). In turn, more liberal
financial policies stimulated the flow of portfolio capital into local equity markets (Henderson,
1998).
  Concerned with national security and internal stability the state bureaucracies of the
nationalist era new little of business and did little to promote business interests, except when it
concerned personal gain (McVey, 1992; Macintyre, 1994). Governments of Indonesia, Malaysia
and Taiwan were preoccupied with the threat posed by internal or external communist parties.
The colonial governments' of Singapore and Hong Kong were relatively indifferent to indigenous
enterprise. With the subsidence of external threats and the ending of colonial rule, state
bureaucracies have recognised the importance of economic development to their political
legitimacy and national prosperity. In addition, rents secured by bureaucrats from office holding
and cronyism are relatively fleeting and insecure. To assure a more secure revenue stream
officials needed to acquire a greater knowledge of business, to enable the official to oversee the
handling of his money, and effective legal guarantees for private property to ensure it could not
be confiscated once out of office. In circumstances of perceived mutual interest and more
balanced-power relations, state officials and entrepreneurs began to develop a measure of trust
and mutual accommodation. A consequence of economic growth has been to convert state
bureaucrats from ‘parasites to promoters’ of business (McVey, 1992:26).
Rapid post war growth and the colonial withdrawal created a managerial vacuum in the
region that was left unfilled for a generation. In the past two decades several new sources of
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managers has emerged. First, is a new generation of university educated managers that are the
product of recently established universities. New Asian managers are more likely than their
parents to have received a university education. Secondly, in the post-war years, large numbers of
students received graduate engineering and business education in Western universities.
Importantly, after graduation many students remained in the west to work for several years before
going home. Returning with technical qualifications and first hand experience many promoted
professional management practices and the absorption of new technology in their firms (Vogel,
1991). Third, an increasing number of young managers are gaining experience in the local
subsidiaries of the region's MNEs. Extensive Japanese investment has been accompanied by the
transfer of management techniques, especially at the plant level (Thong, 1991). Finally, following
de-colonialization many governments paid careful attention to managerial development programs
in state and para-state organisations that are now coming to fruition (Schein, 1996). While many
point to the continuing acute shortages, a pool of trained managers has been assembled that did
not exist in the nationalist era. Moreover, these new managers have been exposed to educational
and organisational influences different from their parents of a prior generation and do not
necessarily embody parental values.
From several perspectives many East and Southeast Asian business environments have
become increasingly munificent in the modern era. Risk and equity capital became more freely
available. A managerial cadre is coming into being that could provide the co-ordinating and
organising capacity needed for technologically complex businesses. State officials more readily
facilitated new business projects. Indeed across the region state officials actively promoted
technological upgrading in their domestic firms through a variety of industrial policies (Wade,
1990,Yeh & Ng, 1994, Noble, 1998, Hobday, 2000). However, despite an environment that is in
many respects hospitable to the development of new industries and technological upgrading,
powerful path dependencies have resulted in organisational and institutional inertia.
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Path Dependence in Institutions and Organisations
At the time of the Asian Financial crisis, many FBGs suffered from sharp over-capacity in
commodity manufacturing and were widely diversified into areas such as property development
and commercial services (Henderson, 1998). Few firms had developed unique distinctive
competencies (Garran, 1999). Despite encouragement by governments FBGs have typically failed
to move into high technology areas (Hobday, 2000). High growth markets are concentrated in
new-technology based industries such as telecommunications, software, and media. The
intellectual property requirements, capital and risk-profiles and internationalism of these new
industries pose a variety problems to the family-centric character of the FBG (McVey, 1992).
Capital intensive ventures in the region have normally been the domain of public
enterprises (Wade, 1992; Mathews, 1997) but state-owned enterprises have not been dynamic in
seizing opportunities in the new industries (Vogel, 1991; Zutshi & Gibbons, 1998). Using
examples of intellectual property, capital markets and managerial development we offer three
illustrations of path dependent processes which cut across organisations and institutional
environments.
First, laws and enforceable regulations that allow firms to profit from their investments in
intellectual property are generally believed to be an essential ingredient in developing an
environment favourable to innovation (Teece, 1998). Now, consider the evolution of rules and
business routines regarding the protection of intellectual property in Southeast and East Asia.  In
the early period of export oriented development many Asian economies focused upon the
production of low-cost but high-quality imitations consumer goods such as toys, watches,
garments and consumer electronics that were designed and developed by others. In these product
areas intellectual property law (such as copyrights, trademarks and patents) afford little protection
for owners, even when enforced, because the concepts and designs can be easily worked around
(Teece, 1986). In the sectors that formed the basis of early industrialisation business routines that
respected intellectual property did not take root.  Indeed in some sectors flagrant counterfeiting
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and abuse of patents and copyright became common business practice (Glassmier, 1994).
Backman finds that this legacy pervades modern day business practice and contends that,
‘industrial producers in Asia often use pirated software, chemicals, production designs and
pharmaceuticals-often without realising they are doing anything wrong’ (1998:26).
Importantly, the intellectual property protection problem is apparently not due to the
absence of regulations. Policymakers now recognise the importance of a supportive home
environment for innovation and more Asian states are paying attention to the protection of
property rights. For example, Berger & Lester (1995) argue that property rights in Hong Kong
now enjoy ‘laws and an enforcement system that are international models, but nonetheless have
an internationally unacceptable levels of violations’. Policy changes, such as Hong Kong’s
attempts to strengthen its protection of intellectual property, do little to alter the underlying norms
and business routines that are needed to make such policies work.
Lax attitudes toward intellectual property protection may have assisted the development
of some export industries, however, these attitudes and routines became widespread and deeply
embedded in what North (1990) calls the institutional matrix. Consequently, new and high value
added industries whose revenues depend upon patent or copyright protection are now at a
disadvantage. For example, software and film production both depend upon respect for copyrights
for their revenues. In Asia, the development of both has been hampered by lax enforcement of
property rights. Estimates suggest that between 65% and 75% of all PC software in Indonesia,
Malaysia, Singapore and Taiwan are pirate copies (FEER, 1998). In the absence of revenues from
local software sales, it is difficult to establish a software business from a domestic base.
Similarly, production in Hong Kong’s vibrant and internationally acclaimed, film industry has
almost ceased in recent years due to the growth of the pirate videodisc industry. Local filmmakers
cannot derive revenue from local markets so production funding has vanished. Many of Hong
Kong’s most talented filmmakers and actors have migrated to Hollywood to make films (The
Economist, 1999).
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In the wake of the Asian financial crisis, a number of analyses have pointed to systematic
problems in the region’s financial systems (Claessens, 1998; Goldstein, 1998). At the centre of
many analyses are problems stemming from the dominance of bank financing (Prowse, 1996;
Huang & Xu, 1999) and the comparative underdevelopment of public and private equity markets.
The dominant role of banks can be seen as a path dependency stemming from Asia’s rapid
industrialisation. In the early phases of the region’s post WWII growth period, infrastructure
building and support for export led manufacturing were fuelled by capital from international aid
organisations and development banks (World Bank, 1993). State owned banks in particular were
oriented toward funding developmental and infrastructural projects (Singh, 1998). As these
economies grew rapidly, banks consolidated their dominant position as the major form of
financial intermediary. Moreover, states that attempted to influence industrial policy and direct
investment to government priorities could better accomplish their goals through a tightly
regulated banking sector (Noble, 1998; Rajan & Zingales, 1998) than through diffuse actors in
equity markets. To better control the allocation of capital governments in the region actively and
passively suppressed non-bank sources of financing (Prowse, 1996; 1998). Furthermore, FBGs
tended to remain private and to finance their growth through internally generated cash flows
(Akyuz & Gore, 1996; Singh, 1998) so as to retain control in the hands of a single family.
Government policy and firm financing preferences combined to leave public equity markets
relatively underdeveloped.
Banks are structurally suited to provide long term debt and working capital to
manufacturing firms or to firms who can back their loans with liquid or marketable assets as
collateral (Miller, 1998; Rajan & Zingales, 1998). However, due to prudential lending
requirements, banks are not well structured to provide risk capital or to lend to businesses whose
assets cannot be backed by marketable or collateralised assets. For example, bank debt is rarely
used to support R&D projects that have risky cash flow outcomes and little residual value in the
event of failure. Therefore, in bank dominated financial systems that have underdeveloped equity
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markets, firms with innovative but risky projects and firms whose assets are intellectual property
or intangibles can face severe capital constraints (Prowse, 1996, UNCTAD, 1998). Along with
weak protection for intellectual property, the lack of risk capital can also inhibit the development
of new industries.
Path dependencies have also created a managerial capacity constraint in many East Asian
economies. Although a pool of trained managers has emerged in the region in recent years, the
development of that cadre at very senior levels of organisation has been limited by FBG
preferences for selecting top management on the basis of family ties, rather than on the basis of
professional expertise. Many researchers have described and documented this tendency among
Chinese FBGs in particular (Wong, 1988; Fukuyama, 1995; Weidenbaum & Hughes, 1996).
Redding (1990) notes that while mangers are hired for technical positions they are frequently
excluded from strategic decisions. Consequently, experienced professional managers are
relatively rare in the region since FBGs did not make extensive use of them (Carney, 1998).
A consequence of selecting top management from a narrow circle of kin or close business
associates is that the top management team is often quite homogenous and lacking in the diversity
of skills needed to grow the organisation. Other manifestations of this self-imposed managerial
capacity constraint are evident when one considers the conspicuous difficulty Chinese East Asian
FBGs have encountered in entering overseas and especially Western markets (Pangarker, 1998),
and markets where they confront political and social conditions different from their domestic
markets (Hu, 1995). Consequently the Asian Multinational organisation tends to be focused
within the Asian region (Lecraw, 1993; Yeung, 1994)
As latecomer industrialisers (Hobday, 1995) Asian FBGs began a path dependent
development pattern that initially focused their activities as imitators at the mature stage of
various product-market life cycles. Surrounding elements in the institutional environment,
including intellectual property norms, capital markets, and managerial recruitment practises
became adapted to imperatives of cost-based competition in mature commodity markets.  Asian
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FBGs have pushed this strategy to the limit and now confront competition from ever-lower cost
rivals located in Mainland China and elsewhere. As such, FBGs face pressures to upgrade their
competencies and to enter the initiating stage of the product life cycle. In meeting these pressures,
however, FBGs must seek to re-orient business routines that were perfected for the conditions and
challenges of a very different historical era. Moreover, they must accomplish this re-orientation
from an institutional base which they played a major role in creating, but which now impedes,
rather than supports the major changes which are required.
Note(s)
1Taiwanese and Indonesian colonial government ended abruptly in 1945 and 1949 respectively.
Self-government in Malaya (Singapore and Malaysia) was introduced more gradually and later,
and much later in the case of Hong Kong. Except briefly during the brief Japanese occupation of
World War II the Philippines and Thailand did not experience full colonial administration.
Nevertheless economic activity in both countries was largely in the hands of organisations we call
foreign and colonial agents. Following World War II both were characterised by a more assertive
self-government than had obtained in prior era.
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